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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance for a 
sample of 169 listed corporations from 2002 to 2007 in South Africa (SA). Our findings 
suggest a statistically significant and positive association between the frequency of 
corporate board meetings and corporate performance, implying that SA boards that meet 
more frequently tend to generate higher financial performance. A further investigation 
indicates a significant non-monotonic link between the frequency of corporate board 
meetings and corporate performance, suggesting that either a relatively small or large 
number of corporate board meetings impacts positively on corporate performance. Our 
findings are consistent across a raft of econometric models that control for different types 
of endogeneities and corporate performance proxies. Our results provide empirical 
support for agency theory, which suggests that corporate boards that meet more 
frequently have increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline 
management, and thereby improving corporate financial performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper examines the impact of board meetings on corporate performance in 
South Africa (SA). As will be further discussed, SA has pursued corporate governance 
(CG) reforms, mainly in the form of the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (King II) King Reports. 
Generally, the King Reports have sought to improve standards of CG in SA. More 
specifically, however, the reforms have focused on enhancing corporate performance by 
improving the independence and monitoring power of corporate boards of directors (Ntim 
2009; Ntim et al 2011a). An important measure of corporate boards’ monitoring power 
and effectiveness is the frequency of board meetings (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 
1993). Indeed, the continuing intense public (Lipton and Lorsch 1992) and academic 
(Jensen 1993; Vefeas 1999a, b) debate on corporate board meetings bears testimony to 
the view that the frequency of board meetings may affect corporate performance.  
However, and whilst theoretically, there is a consensus that corporate board 
meetings play an important role in the governance, conformance and performance of 
companies (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993), the empirical evidence (reviewed 
below) on the impact of board meetings on corporate performance is conflicting. A 
number of important issues, however, have been pointed out with respect to the findings 
of past studies that may explain the mixed evidence. First, previous studies have been 
criticised for potential methodological weaknesses. Specifically, past studies have been 
criticised for heavily relying on ordinary least square regressions (OLS), as well as for 
not adequately addressing endogeneity problems (Vefeas 1999a; Fich and Shivdasani 
2006). For example, and as companies tend to vary in the problems and opportunities that 
they face over time, this can lead to a scenario where board meetings and corporate 
performance are jointly and dynamically determined by firm-level heterogeneities, such 
as company culture and managerial talent (Guest 2009; Ntim et al 2011b), which simple 
OLS regressions may fail to identify (Wooldridge 2002; Gujarati 2003), and thereby 
leading to spurious results. Second, it has been suggested that the effect of board 
meetings on corporate performance may not just vary by firm-level characteristics, but 
also by variations in country-specific CG, institutional and legal practices (Karamanou 
and Vafeas 2005). This notwithstanding, there is a heavy concentration of existing studies 
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in a few matured economies of Europe and North America, which depict comparatively 
similar institutional contexts (Yermack 1996; Vefeas 1999a, b).  
Arguably, in emerging and less developed countries with different institutional 
contexts, legal and CG practices (as discussed further below), the effectiveness of 
corporate board meetings may differ, and consequently the impact of board meetings on 
corporate performance can be expected to be different from what has been reported in 
developed countries. Therefore, an examination of the impact of board meetings on 
corporate performance in developing African countries, where there is an acute lack of 
empirical evidence will be important in providing a more complete understanding of the 
effect of board meetings on corporate performance (El Mehdi 2007; Ntim 2009).  
In this paper, we investigate the effect of board meetings on performance for SA 
companies. SA provides an interesting context to examine the association between board 
meetings and corporate performance. Similar to other Anglo-American countries, SA has 
pursued CG reforms in the form of King I and II. As previously explained, the main 
objective of the King Reports, especially King II is to improve CG standards by 
improving the independence and monitoring power of SA corporate boards (Ntim et al 
2011b). As will be discussed further, and with specific reference to board meetings, King 
II suggests that corporate boards should voluntarily meet at least four times in a year.  
However, the SA corporate context is distinctively characterised by concentrated 
ownership, greater institutional ownership, but weaker shareholder activism and poor 
enforcement of corporate laws (Bar et al 1995; Ntim et al 2011a). Concentrated 
ownership, for instance, can limit the effectiveness of the market for corporate control 
(Ntim et al 2011b; Ntim 2009). This can have a negative effect on the wiliness of firms to 
voluntarily comply and disclose CG rules, including those relating to the frequency of 
board meetings, and thereby impairing the capacity of a voluntary code to improve CG 
standards by enhancing the independence and monitoring power of corporate boards. We 
argue that the rich research context in terms of differences with developed countries, in 
addition to the conspicuous dearth of prior studies serves as a compelling basis to 
examine the impact of board meetings on corporate performance in SA. 
This paper contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, using a 
sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we provide evidence on the impact of 
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board meetings on corporate performance in SA. To the best of our knowledge, this paper 
presents a first attempt at modelling the board meetings-performance association within a 
Sub-Saharan African context, with particular reference to SA, and thus crucially extends 
the literature to that sub-continent. This also contributes to the largely developed 
countries-based literature (Europe and North America) on the link between board 
meetings and performance. Second, and for the first time, we provide evidence on the 
non-linear relationship between the frequency of board meetings and corporate 
performance. Third, and distinct from most prior studies, we use econometric models that 
sufficiently address different types of endogeneity problems, including firm-level fixed-
effects and simultaneity.  
Our findings suggest a statistically significant and positive association between 
the frequency of board meetings and corporate performance, implying that SA boards that 
meets more frequently tend to generate higher financial performance. A further 
investigation indicates a significant non-monotonic link between the frequency of board 
meetings and performance, suggesting that either a relatively small or large number 
corporate board meetings impacts positively on corporate performance. The results are 
robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of 
endogeneities and corporate performance proxies. Our findings provide empirical support 
for agency theory, which suggests that corporate boards that meet more frequently have 
increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline management, and thereby 
enhancing corporate financial performance.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the CG environment in SA. Section 3 reviews the prior literature on the 
impact of board meetings on corporate performance. Section 4 describes the research 
design. Section 5 reports empirical analyses, while section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Corporate Governance Environment in South Africa 
Efforts at enhancing CG practices in SA began with the publication of the first 
King Report (King I) in 1994 (King Report 2002; Ntim et al 2011b). Arguably, King I 
explicitly institutionalised CG practices in SA (King Report 2002; Ntim et al 2011a). The 
King I proposals were heavily informed by those of the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992 
 
4 
 
 
(King Report 2002; Ntim 2009). For example, and similar to the Cadbury Report, King I 
proposed an Anglo-American style unitary board of directors, made up of executive and 
non-executive director, who are mainly accountable to shareholders within a voluntary 
CG regime (King Report 2002; Ntim et al 2011b). With specific reference to the 
frequency of board meetings, King I did not specify the exact number or frequency that 
corporate boards should meet, but set a general principle that all boards should meet 
regularly in order to effectively advise, monitor and discipline management. Arguably, 
the apparent lack of clarity as to the frequency of corporate board meetings seriously 
impaired its effectiveness in improving board independence and monitoring, and 
consequently the ability to conduct any meaningful empirical analysis. Therefore, King I 
was replaced in 2002 with a second King Report (King II) in order to address some of the 
limitations with King I.  
Generally, King II builds on and expands most of the Anglo-American features of 
King I that were aimed at improving the independence and monitoring power of 
corporate boards, including maintaining the central characteristic of unitary boards 
operating within a voluntary CG regime (Ntim 2009; Ntim et al 2011a, b). With respect 
to the frequency of board meetings, and unlike King I, King II explicitly suggested that 
corporate boards should at least meet four times in a year (i.e., once in every quarter). 
Crucially, King II proposed further that the frequency of board meetings should be fully 
disclosed in the annual report, and thereby making available data that hitherto have been 
publicly inaccessible. However, critical concerns have been expressed as to whether, 
given the SA context, a voluntary compliance regime like King II can be effective in 
raising CG standards in SA by enhancing the independence and monitoring power of 
corporate boards. Thus, we seek to empirically investigate whether CG proposals relating 
to board meetings contained in King II do impact on corporate financial performance.   
 
3. Prior Literature on the Impact of Board Meetings on Corporate Performance 
Corporate boards of directors carry out critical roles, and thus deemed to be an 
important CG mechanism (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993). Specifically, it been 
suggested that corporate boards advise (expert advice), supervise (monitor) and seek 
accountability (discipline) from management to ensure that managers pursue the interests 
 
5 
 
 
of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ntim 2009). An important proxy of 
measuring the intensity and effectiveness of corporate monitoring and disciplining is the 
frequency of board meetings (Jensen 1993; Vefeas 1999a). However, there are mixed 
theoretical views as to the effect of corporate board meetings on corporate performance 
(see Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993). 
One theoretical proposition is that the frequency of board meetings measures the 
intensity of a board’s activities, and the quality or effectiveness of its monitoring (Vefeas 
1999a; Conger et al 1998). All else equal, a higher frequency of board meetings can result 
in a higher quality of managerial monitoring, and thereby impacts positively on corporate 
financial performance (Vefeas 1999b; Ntim 2009). Also, it has been contended that 
regular meetings allow directors more time to confer, set strategy, and to appraise 
managerial performance (Vafeas 1999a). This can help directors to remain informed and 
knowledgeable about important developments within the firm, and thereby place them in 
a better position to timely address emerging critical problems (Mangena and Tauringana 
2008). In fact, Sonnenfeld (2002) suggests that regular meeting attendance is considered 
a hallmark of the conscientious director. Further, frequent meetings intermingled with 
informal sideline interactions can create and strengthen cohesive bonds among directors 
(Lipton and Lorsch 1992), and thereby impact positively on corporate performance.  
An opposing theoretical view is that board meetings are not necessarily beneficial 
to shareholders. Firstly, Vefeas (1999a) argues that normally the limited time directors 
spend together is not used for the meaningful exchange of ideas among themselves. 
Instead, routine tasks, such as presentation of management reports and various formalities 
absorb much of the meetings, and this reduces the amount of time that outside directors 
would have to effectively monitor management (Lipton and Lorsch 1992), which can 
impact negatively on corporate performance. Secondly, and board meetings are costly in 
the form of managerial time, travel expenses, refreshments and directors’ meeting fees 
(Vafeas 1999a) that can negatively influence corporate performance.  
In fact, Jensen (1993) contends that boards in well-functioning companies should 
be relatively inactive and exhibit little conflicts. He suggests that rather than necessarily 
organising frequent board meetings, it will be more profitable for corporate boards to 
establish a system that is responsive to their specific challenges. For example, directors 
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can increase the frequency of meetings during crisis or when shareholders’ interests are 
visibly in danger, such as when replacing the CEO or fighting hostile takeovers. One 
implication of this is that the association between board meetings and performance can be 
non-linear whereby either a small or large number of meetings can equally impact 
positively on corporate performance. In this case, it is the flexibility with which corporate 
boards are able to either decrease or increase the number of board meetings to deal with 
emerging issues rather than the mere frequency that can influence corporate performance. 
Consistent with Jensen’s (1993) suggestions, Vafeas (1999a) argues that companies that 
are efficient in setting the right frequency of board meetings, depending on its operating 
context, will enjoy economies of scale in agency costs, and thereby enhance corporate 
financial performance.  
The empirical literature is not only equally conflicting, but also overly 
concentrated in a few developed countries in Europe and North America, which depict 
similar institutional context (Yermack 1996; Vefeas 1999a, b; Conger et al 1998; 
Carcello et al 2002). For example, and using a sample of 307 US listed firms over the 
1990-1994 period, Vafeas (1999a) reports a statistically significant and negative 
association between the frequency of board meetings and corporate performance, as 
proxied by Tobin’s Q. By contrast, he finds that operating performance significantly 
improves following a year of abnormal board activity. This suggests that while directors 
who confer more regularly can make better decisions and engage in active monitoring, 
the potential benefits of such intense monitoring are expected to reflect in future years’ 
performance. That is, board decisions may have gestation period within which their full 
benefits may be realised. This may also suggests the presence of endogeneity problems in 
the association between the frequency of board meetings and corporate performance. For 
instance, it is possible for corporate financial performance to improve, following 
increased frequency of board meetings, but such increased board activity might have been 
triggered by poor corporate performance. As will be discussed further, and distinct from 
most previous studies, we explicitly address potential endogenous association between 
board meetings and corporate performance. 
Similarly, and using a sample of 258 of the Fortune 1000 companies, Carcello et 
al (2002) establish a positive relationship between the amount of audit fees paid and the 
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frequency of audit committee meetings. This means that audit committees that meet more 
frequently pay higher audit fees, and thereby impacting negatively on corporate 
performance. Recently, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) offer evidence, which is in line with 
the results of prior research that boards that meet more frequently are valued less by the 
market in a sample of 508 US listed firms from 1989 to 1995.  
On the contrary, using a sample of 275 US listed firms from 1995 to 2000, 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find a positive association between board meeting 
frequency and the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. Also, and of close 
relevance, Mangena and Tauringana (2008) report a positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and corporate performance for a sample of 157 Zimbabwean 
listed firms over the period 2001-2003. Their results support the proposition that 
monitoring becomes more intense in periods of crisis, and companies whose board meet 
more frequently perform better. In contrast, El Mehdi (2007) finds that the frequency of 
board meetings has no association with economic performance in a small sample of 24 
Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005. He suggests that financial performance, which is 
tied most closely to the quality of the day-to-day management of the company, is likely to 
be less affected by the frequency of board meetings. 
With respect to SA, King II and the listing rules of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) Ltd task listed firms to establish a policy for the frequency, purpose, 
conduct and duration of their boards of directors and board subcommittees’ meetings. 
Specifically, and as has previously been discussed, King II recommends that all corporate 
boards should meet regularly, at least once a quarter, which must be disclosed in their 
annual reports. This implies that King II expects a higher frequency of board meetings to 
impact positively on corporate financial performance. However, given the conflicting 
international empirical evidence, we predict a statistically significant relationship 
between board meetings and corporate performance without specifying the direction of 
the coefficient as follows: 
 H1: There is either a statistically significant negative or positive relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings and corporate performance. 
  
4. Research Design 
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4.1 Data 
Due to regulatory and capital structure reasons, 291 companies listed on the JSE 
as at 31/12/2007 from eight non-financial industries, including basic materials, consumer 
goods, consumer services, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, and telecoms 
were considered for inclusion in our sample. We use CG and financial variables to 
investigate the impact of board meetings on corporate performance. The CG variables 
were collected from the sampled companies’ annual reports. We downloaded the annual 
reports from the Perfect Information Database. The financial data were collected from 
DataStream. The companies in our final sample had to meet two criteria. First, a 
company’s complete 5-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive are available. 
Second, the company’s corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007 is also available.1  
The criteria were set for several reasons. First, and in line with prior studies (Yermack 
1996; Vefeas 1999a), the criteria ensured that the requirements for a balanced panel data 
analysis were met. Advantages for using panel data include having both time series and 
cross-sectional observations, more degrees of freedom and less collinearity among 
variables (Wooldridge 2002; Gujarati 2003). Second, analysis of 5-year data with both 
cross-sectional and time series properties may help in ascertaining whether the observed 
cross-sectional link between board meetings and corporate performance also holds over 
time, and thereby facilitates direct comparisons to be drawn with the findings of previous 
studies (Yermack 1996; Carcello et al 2002). Using the above criteria, the complete data 
required is obtained for a total of 169 companies over 5-company years and 8 industries 
for our regression analysis.  
 
4.2 Measures and Variables 
The frequency of corporate board meetings (FBMs) is our main independent 
variable in all our regressions, which is measured as the natural log of the total number of 
board meetings in a year. The widely used Tobin’s Q (Q) is our main measure of 
                                                 
1
It takes time for board decisions to reflect in firm value (Vefeas 1999a, b). Hence, to avoid endogenous 
relationship between board meetings and corporate performance, we introduce a one year lag between 
board meetings and corporate performance such that this year’s performance depends on last year’s 
governance structure similar to Vefeas (1999a), as specified in equation (1) below. The sample also begins 
from 2002 for two reasons. Firstly, King II came into operation in 2002, and secondly, data coverage in 
Perfect Information/DataStream on SA listed firms is very low until 2002. 
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corporate performance (dependent variable). However, we apply return on assets (ROA) 
and total shareholder return (TSR) to check the robustness of our results to alternative 
accounting and market-based corporate performance proxies, respectively. In line with 
Vefeas (1999a) and Carcello et al (2002), we include below a number of control variables. 
First, companies with higher investment avenues grow faster (Henry 2008), and are likely 
to be associated with higher corporate performance. Therefore, we expect sales growth 
(GROWTH) to be positively related to corporate performance. Second, corporations that 
invest more in research and development can gain competitive advantages (Vefeas 1999a; 
Ntim 2009), and thus may receive higher corporate performance. By contrast, research 
and development need higher capital investment (Vefeas 1999b), and as such, may 
impact negatively on current corporate performance.  
In a similar vein, greater use of debt can improve performance by minimising the 
ability of managers to expropriate excess cash flows (Jensen 1986). On the contrary, 
greater levels of debt usage can result in financial distress, and minimise the ability of 
companies to take advantage of growth opportunities. Also, as a result of bigger agency 
problems, larger corporations are more likely to have good governance mechanisms 
(Beiner et al 2006), and thus may generate higher corporate performance. In contrast, 
smaller companies are more likely to have greater avenues to grow, and therefore, may be 
positively related to corporate performance. Given the conflicting evidence, our 
prediction is that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and firm size (LNTA) 
will either impact positively or negatively on corporate performance. Third, companies 
that maintain listings on foreign stock markets tend to have higher funding and 
investment avenues, and as such may be positively related to corporate performance. 
Therefore, we expect cross-listing (CROSLIST) to be positively associated with corporate 
performance. Fourth, DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit firm size impacts positively on 
auditor independence and audit quality, and hence companies audited by large audit 
companies may be associated with higher corporate performance. Therefore, we expect 
audit firm size (BIG4) to have a positive impact on corporate performance.  
Fifth, government ownership may be associated with access to critical resources, 
such as finance and profitable government contracts (Murray 2000; Ntim 2009). 
Therefore, we expect a positive link between government ownership (GOVOWN) and 
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corporate performance. Sixth, corporations that voluntarily set up CG committee to 
specifically monitor CG standards may be able to reduce managerial expropriation of 
corporate resources, and as such may generate higher corporate performance. Thus, we 
expect the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) to be positively related to corporate 
performance. Finally, in line with Vefeas (1999a, b) and Guest (2009), we expect that 
corporate performance will differ across different industries and financial years. 
Therefore, we include industry (INDUST) dummies for the 5 remaining industries
2
: basic 
materials and oil & gas; consumer goods; consumer services and health care; industrials; 
and technology & telecommunications; and year (YD) dummies for the financial years 
2003 to 2007.  
 
5. Empirical Analyses  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Regression Analyses 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all variables that we use in conducting our 
fixed-effects regressions. Table 1 shows, for example, that Q is between a minimum of 
0.72 and a maximum of 3.60 with an average of 1.56. In line with the findings of Vefeas 
(1999a) and Carcello et al 2002, the FBMs ranges from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 
15 with a median of 4 board meetings in a year. The alternative corporate performance 
proxies, as well as the control variables indicate wide variations, suggesting that our 
sample has been sufficiently chosen to achieve adequate variation, and thus eliminate any 
possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
We conduct correlation analysis in order to ascertain the level of collinearity 
among the variables. Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for all variables that we use in 
running our fixed-effects regressions. For robustness purposes, the bottom left half of the 
table presents Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the 
table reports Pearson’s parametric coefficients. Both the magnitude and direction of the 
                                                 
2
For lack of sufficient number of observations in 3 industries, namely health care, oil and gas, and 
telecommunications industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, were merged with the 
closest remaining five major industries. As a result, the three health care firms were added to the consumer 
services industry, the one oil and gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, whereas the three 
telecoms companies were also shared out to the technology firms. 
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parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients are very similar, indicating that no 
major non-normality problems exist. Also, both matrices suggest that correlations among 
the variables are fairly low, implying that no serious multicollinearity problems exist 
among the variables.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
In addition, Table 2 suggests statistically significant links between the corporate 
performance proxies and FBMs. For example, FBMs is statistically significant and 
positively related to Q, ROA and TSR, suggesting that SA boards that meet more 
regularly tend to generate higher corporate performance. Finally, there are statistically 
significant relations between the corporate performance measures and the control 
variables. For example, CAPEX and GEAR are statistically significant and negatively 
associated with Q, ROA and TSR, whereas BIG4, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GOVOWN and 
GROWTH, are statistically significant and positively correlated to Q, ROA and TSR, as 
hypothesised. 
 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses 
As previously noted, companies tend to differ in the challenges and opportunities 
that they encounter over time. This can lead to a situation whereby FBMs and Q are 
jointly and dynamically determined by firm-level differences, such as firm complexity 
and managerial quality (Guest 2009; Ntim 2009), which simple OLS regressions may fail 
to uncover (Wooldridge 2002; Gujarati 2003), and thereby resulting in misleading 
findings. Therefore, given the panel nature of our data and in line with prior research 
(Henry 2008; Guest 2009; Ntim et al 2011b), we run fixed-effects regressions to control 
for possible unobserved firm-level heterogeneities. We begin our analysis with basic 
fixed-effects regression specified as follows: 
               

 
n
i
itititiitt CONTROLSFBMsQ
1
111110                     (1) 
where: Q is the main dependent variable, FBMs is the main explanatory variable, 
CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, 
CROSLIST, GOVOWN, GROWTH, INDUST and YD, and δ refers to the firm-specific 
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fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of 168 year dummies to represent the 169 sampled 
firms. 
Table 3 reports fixed-effects regressions results of FBMs on Q. First, to examine 
whether the FBMs is related to Q, we regress Q on FBMs alone without the control 
variables using equation (1). Statistically significant and positive effect of FBMs on Q is 
observable in Model 1 of Table 3. However, the coefficient on the constant term in Model 
1 of Table 3 is statistically significant and seems to suggest that there may be omitted 
variables bias. We, therefore, add the control variables in models 2 to 8 in order to control 
for potential omitted variables bias. Importantly, the coefficient on FBMs remains 
statistically significant and positive in Model 2 of Table 3, and thereby providing support 
for H1 that SA boards that meet more frequently tend to generate higher corporate 
performance. Theoretically, our findings is consistent with agency theory that indicates 
that corporate boards that meet more frequently have increased ability to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline management, and thereby improving corporate financial 
performance (Vefeas 1999a; Conger et al 1998). Our evidence also provides support for 
the findings of previous studies (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Mangena and Tauringana 
2008) that report a positive association between FBMs and corporate performance, but 
inconsistent with those that either report a negative (Vefeas 1999a; Carcello et al 2002; 
Fich and Shivdasani 2006) or no (El Mehdi 2007) relationship.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Second, to test whether there is a non-linear relationship between FBMs and 
corporate performance, such that either a small or large number of board meetings 
impacts positively on corporate performance, as suggested by Jensen (1993), we re-run 
equation (1) using squared (FBMs
2
) and cubed (FBMs
3
) versions of FBMs. Statistically 
significant and positive effect of FBMs
2
 and FBMs
3
 on Q is noticeable in Models 3 and 4 
of Table 3, respectively, and thereby providing new empirical support for theoretical 
suggestions that either a low or high frequency of board meetings can equally improve 
corporate performance. To check whether our non-monotonic evidence is sensitive to the 
simultaneous presence of the three board meetings proxies, we re-regress equation (1) by 
contemporaneously including FBMs, FBMs
2
 and FBMs
3
. The coefficients on all three are 
observably positive and statistically significant in Model 5 of Table 3, and thereby 
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suggesting that our evidence of a curvilinear association between Q and FBMs is robust 
to this specification.  
The implication of our evidence is that corporations can design board meeting 
arrangements that are both flexible and responsive to their specific challenges. For 
example, directors can increase the frequency of meetings during crisis or when 
shareholders’ interests are visibly in danger, such as when replacing the CEO or fighting 
hostile takeovers. In contrast, the frequency of board meetings can substantially be 
reduced when there is a significant decrease in the corporate problems, in which board 
meetings and decisions can influence shareholder value. Whilst the finding that FBMs is 
positively associated with Q provides support for the recommendations of King II that 
corporate boards should at least meet four times in a year, our additional evidence of a 
non-linear relationship between FBMs and Q suggests further that the concept that ‘one-
size fits all’ may also be inappropriate. 
Finally, and generally, the coefficients on the control variables in Models 1 to 5 of 
Table 3 are of the same sign, as predicted. For instance, BIG4, CGCOM, CROSLIST, 
GOVOWN and GROWTH are statistically significant and positively associated with Q, 
whereas the coefficients on CAPEX, GEAR and LNTA are statistically significant and 
negatively related to Q in Models 1 to 5, as hypothesised. Finally, the F-values in Table 3 
consistently reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on FBMs and the control 
variables are equal to zero. Consistent with previous evidence (Vefeas 1999a; Carcello et 
al 2002), the adjusted R
2
 is between 2% and 37%, implying that our fixed-effects 
regressions can explain significant differences in our sampled companies’ Q. 
 
5.3 Additional Analyses 
Our fixed-effects regression analyses so far do not take into account alternative 
corporate performance measures and other potential endogeneity problems, implying that 
the positive effect of board meetings on corporate performance, for instance, may be 
misleading. In this subsection, we investigate how robust our findings are to the use of 
alternative corporate performance proxies, as well as the existence of endogeneities.  
First, we examine the sensitivity of our findings to two alternative performance 
measures that we have data on: return on assets (ROA – an accounting based proxy) and 
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total share returns (TSR – a market based measure). Models 6 and 7 of Table 3 report 
results based on using ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically significant 
and positive impact of FBMs on Q in both models is observable, and thereby implying 
that our results are robust when an accounting (ROA) or a market (TSR) based measure of 
corporate performance is applied instead of Q. 
Second, to address potential additional endogeneity problems that may be caused 
by omitted variable bias, we rely on the widely applied two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methodology (Beiner et al 2006; Henry 2008). However, to be certain that the 2SLS 
methodology is ideal, and in line with Beiner et al (2006), we first carry out Durbin-Wu-
Hausman exogeneity test (see Beiner et al 2006: 267) to test for the existence of an 
endogenous link between Q and FBMs. Applied to equation (1), the test fails to accept the 
null hypothesis of no endogeneity, and therefore, we conclude that the 2SLS methodology 
may be appropriate and that our fixed-effects results may be misleading.
 
In the first stage, 
we assume that the FBMs will be determined by the ten control variables (as exogenous 
variables) contained in equation (1). In the second stage, we use the predicted part of the 
FBMs (PRE_FBMs) as an instrument for FBMs and re-estimate equation on as follows:
 
                               


n
i
itititiitt CONTROLSFBMsQ
1
10
ˆ                            (2) 
where everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except that we use the 
predicted FBMs (PRE_FBMs) from the first-stage estimation as an instrument for the 
FBMs. The coefficient on the PRE_FBMs in Model 8 of Table 3 is positive and 
statistically significant, and thereby implying that our evidence of a positive impact of 
FBMs on Q is robust to endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted variables. 
Overall, the additional analyses indicate that our results are robust to different forms of 
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endogeneity problems, including simultaneity and omitted variables bias, as well as 
different corporate performance proxies.  
   
6. Summary and Conclusion  
 Using a sample of 169 South African (SA) listed corporations, this paper 
investigates the impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance. This 
coincides with a period during which the SA authorities pursued corporate governance 
(CG) reforms, which have primarily been aimed at improving board independence and 
monitoring power in the form of the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (KING II) reports. Our 
findings suggest a statistically significant and positive association between the frequency 
of corporate board meetings and corporate performance, implying that SA boards that 
meet more frequently tend to generate higher financial performance. A further 
investigation indicates a significant non-monotonic link between the frequency of 
corporate board meetings and corporate performance, suggesting that either a relatively 
small or large number of corporate board meetings impacts positively on corporate 
performance. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that control 
for different types of endogeneities and corporate performance proxies. Our results 
provide empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that corporate boards that 
meet more frequently have increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and 
discipline management, and thereby improving corporate financial performance.  
Our evidence also has important regulatory and policy implications. Whilst the 
finding that FBMs is positively associated with Q provides support for the 
recommendations of King II that corporate boards should at least meet four times in a 
year, our additional evidence of a non-linear relationship between FBMs and Q suggests 
further that the concept that ‘one-size fits all’ may also be inappropriate. Since SA 
corporations vary in size, industry and sophistication of operations, it is reasonable to 
argue that adopting a ‘flexible and responsive’ instead of ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
corporate board meetings may improve corporate performance.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of all variables for all (845) firm years 
Variable     Mean Median         Std. dev.       Maximum      Minimum 
Corporate performance (Dependent Variables) 
Q                  1.56    1.34  0.67             3.60            0.72  
ROA                             0.11    0.12  0.14  0.38           -0.19  
TSR                             0.28    0.25             0.89             2.36           -0.48 
Corporate board meetings (Main independent variable) 
FBMs       4.70    4.00  2.18           15.00            1.00 
Control variables 
BIG4                               0.73                1.00               0.44                1.00                0.00 
CAPEX                 0.13     0.08   0.15  0.66            0.07 
CGCOM      0.32     0.00   0.47  1.00            0.00 
CROSLIST      0.22     0.00   0.41  1.00            0.00 
GEAR                  0.32     0.19              0.31             0.78            0.01 
GOVOWN                      0.38     0.00   0.49  1.00            0.00 
GROWTH      0.12     0.14   0.26            0.89           -0.44 
LNTA       5.86                6.02               0.48                7.83                4.24 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book 
value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  Return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of 
operating profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total shareholder 
returns made up of share price and dividends. Frequency of board meetings (FBMs), measured as the 
natural log of the total number of corporate board meetings in a year. Audit firm size (BIG4), measured as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Cross-listing 
(CROSLIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed to a foreign 
stock market, 0 otherwise. The presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), defined as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 
otherwise. Gearing (GEAR), calculated as the Ratio of total debts to market value of equity.  Government 
ownership (GOVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership 
is at least 5%, 0 otherwise. Sales growth (GROWTH), calculated as the current year’s sales minus last 
year’s sales to last year’s sales. Firm size (LNTA), measured as the natural log of total assets. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of all variables for all (845) firm years  
Variable                Q              ROA        TSR           FBMs        FBMs2        FBMs3       GOVOWN     GROWTH    CAPEX      LNTA      GEAR       BIG4    CROSLIST   CGCOM 
Q   .191***  .190***     .182***      .162***          .138*** .124***     .137***         -.198***      -.162***      -.170***     .188***  .129***     .168***  
 
ROA            .383***    .119***     .148***       .156***          .143***  .198***      .150***        -.171***       -.251***      -.150***     .133***   .176***     .185***  
 
TSR                    .286***         .276***      .164***        .154***        .141***  .110***      .109***        -.087**         -.168***      -.162***    .178***   .132***     .134***  
        
FBMs                 .118***         .117***   .164***         .698
**         .676***  .141***      .079**           .041            .174***        .015          .117***   .128***     .115***  
        
FBMs2                .114***         .116***   .156***     -.785***                     .924***  .099***      .028           .053           .122***         .027         .080**   .104***     .089** 
 
FBMs3                .110***         .112***   .150***        .756***         .738***   .064
*      .018           .036           .078**          .020          .045   .080**     .066* 
 
GOVOWN         .228***         .208***   .169***      .174***         .172***       .170**       .026
             -.080**        .615***        -.056*        .296***   .470***     .324***  
 
GROWTH          .127***        .241***   .214***      .135***         .133***       .130***  .078**           -.038          .007             -.040         .008   -.034      .002
 
 
CAPEX           -.481***       -.197***  -.141***       -.167**           .165***     -.160*** -.070**          -.059*                         .028              .480***     .009   -.056    -.091** 
 
LNTA           -.191**         .130***   .138***         .247***         .245***      .240***  .638***          .116***        .067**                  .085**       .434***    .475***     .455***  
 
GEAR           -.458***       -.289***  -.196***         .041             .040           .037 -.107***         -.071**         .510***        .088**                -.020   -.036     -.053  
 
BIG4            .145***        .180***   .170***         .148***        .146***       .140***  .296***          .014            .066*           .441***        -.039     .253***      .216*** 
 
CROSLIST        .170***       .173***   .132***         .155***        .153***       .150***  .470***         -.026            .009            .470***        -.029          .256***         .363*** 
 
CGCOM            .163***       .162***   .173***         .153***        .150***       .148***  .324***          .017           -.001            .457***         -.034         .219***         .368*** 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Pearson’s parametric 
correlation coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q (Q), return on 
assets (ROA), total shareholder return (TSR), the frequency of corporate board meetings (FBMs), the frequency of corporate board meetings squared (FBMs2), the frequency of 
corporate board meetings cubed (FBMs3), government ownership (GOVOWN), sales growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), audit 
firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM). Table 1 above fully defines all the variables used. 
  
 
20 
 
 
Table 3. Fixed-effects regressions of the impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance 
Dep. variable Q Q Q Q Q ROA TSR 2SLS (Q) 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
(N) 
      0.020 
   5.063*** 
(845) 
        0.365 
  11.130*** 
(845) 
         0.363 
10.458*** 
          (845) 
        0.360 
  10.280*** 
(845) 
       0.372 
11.830*** 
(845) 
      0.380 
    12.518*** 
       (845) 
0.349  
    9.380*** 
(845) 
     0.389 
   12.960*** 
(845) 
Constant      1.403 
  (0.000)*** 
        1.517 
      (0.000)*** 
         1.500 
       (0.000)*** 
        1.425 
       (0.000)*** 
       1.544 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.127 
  (0.985) 
        6.341 
       (0.005)*** 
     3.097 
(0.000)*** 
Indep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FBMs 
 
FBMs
2 
 
FBMs
3 
 
PRE_FBMs 
     0.036 
    (0.025)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
        0.021 
      (0.040)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.018 
  (0.046)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
             - 
             - 
             - 
             - 
          0.015 
         (0.050)** 
- 
- 
       0.041 
      (0.013)** 
       0.020 
      (0.039)** 
       0.008 
      (0.054)* 
- 
- 
0.422 
    (0.008)*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
       0.995 
      (0.038)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
      0.050 
     (0.000)*** 
Cont. variables  
BIG4 
 
CAPEX 
 
CGCOM 
 
CROSLIST 
 
GEAR 
 
GOVOWN 
 
GROWTH 
 
LNTA 
 
INDUST 
YD 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
       0.143 
      (0.014)** 
      -0.009 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.210 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.228 
      (0.040)** 
      -0.010 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.112 
      (0.010)*** 
       0.173 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.208 
      (0.000)*** 
     Included 
     Included 
        0.142 
       (0.016)** 
       -0.007 
       (0.001)*** 
        0.208 
       (0.000)*** 
        0.225 
       (0.043)** 
       -0008 
       (0.000)*** 
        0.107 
       (0.011)** 
        0.168 
       (0.000)*** 
       -0.205 
       (0.000)*** 
      Included 
      Included 
         0.141 
        (0.019)** 
        -0.005 
        (0.001)*** 
         0.205 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.220 
        (0.046)** 
        -0.006 
        (0.000)*** 
         0.103 
        (0.032)** 
         0.164 
        (0.000)*** 
        -0.203 
        (0.000)*** 
        Included 
        Included 
       0.140 
      (0.024)*** 
      -0.006 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.211 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.226 
      (0.042)*** 
      -0.009 
      (0.000)*** 
       0.105 
      (0.029)*** 
       0.170 
      (0.000)*** 
      -0.206 
      (0.000)*** 
      Included 
      Included 
       0.821 
      (0.018)** 
      -0.045 
      (0.013)** 
       1.631 
      (0.023)** 
       2.287 
      (0.046)** 
     -0.163 
     (0.000)*** 
      7.068 
     (0.000)*** 
      0.246 
     (0.000)*** 
     -2.791 
     (0.000)*** 
     Included 
     Included 
4.246 
   (0.038)** 
-0.117 
  (0.085)* 
1.741 
  (0.037)** 
2.579 
    (0.007)*** 
-0.380 
     (0.000)*** 
6.944 
    (0.000)*** 
0.144 
    (0.000)*** 
   -6.436*** 
(0.000) 
Included 
Included 
0.190 
    (0.000)*** 
     -0.012 
    (0.000)*** 
0.218 
    (0.000)*** 
0.275 
   (0.000)*** 
 -0.014*** 
(0.000) 
    0.356*** 
(0.000) 
    0.175*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.280*** 
(0.000) 
Included 
Included 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using 
the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin’s (Q), return on assets (ROA), total shareholder return (TSR), frequency of board meetings (FBMs), frequency of 
corporate board meetings squared (FBMs2), frequency of corporate board meetings cube (FBMs3), predicted  FBMs (PRE_FBMs) – obtained by regressing FBMs on the control variables and used as an 
instrument for the FBMs in model 8, audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), gearing (GEAR), 
government ownership (GOVOWN), firm size (LNTA), industry dummies (INDUST), and year dummies (YD). Table 1 above fully defines all the variables used. 
